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  Her	  pace	  is	  strangely	  regular,	  every	  movement	  seems	  to	  depend	  on	  some	  wound-­‐up	  clockwork.	  Her	  playing	  and	  her	  singing	  keep	  the	  same	  unpleasantly	  correct	  and	  spiritless	  time	  as	  a	  musical	  box	  …	  We	  find	  your	  Olympia	  quite	  uncanny	  …	  She	  seems	  to	  act	  like	  a	  living	  being,	  and	  yet	  has	  some	  strange	  peculiarity	  of	  her	  own.	  E.T.A.	  Hoffmann,	  ‘The	  Sandman’	  (1816).1	  	  …	  the	  boundary	  between	  science	  fiction	  and	  social	  reality	  is	  an	  optical	  illusion.	  Donna	  Haraway,	  ‘A	  Cyborg	  Manifesto:	  Science,	  Technology	  and	  Socialist-­‐Feminism	  in	  the	  Late	  Twentieth	  Century’	  (1985).2	  	  There	  was	  much	  that	  was	  uncanny	  about	  Australia’s	  2010	  federal	  election;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  numbingly	  familiar	  and	  yet	  deeply	  strange.	  The	  rightward	  convergence	  between	  the	   major	   parties,	   monotonously	   observed	   during	   the	   election	   campaign,	  metamorphosed	   into	   a	   hung	   parliament.	   It	   is	   a	   parliament	   that—or	   so	   it	   would	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seem—runs	   counter	   to	   the	   more	   visible	   conservative	   trajectory	   we	   had	   become	  accustomed	  to	  over	  the	  previous	  decade.	  Labor	  and	  the	  Liberal–National	  Coalition,	  increasingly	   narrowcasting	   their	   pitch	   to	   a	   few	   thousand	   swinging	   voters	   in	  marginal	  electorates,	  failed	  to	  gain	  a	  majority	  of	  seats,	  and	  appeared	  to	  be	  leaking	  to	  their	   left.	  Three	   independents	   (two	  of	  whom	  had	  previously	  been	  members	  of	   the	  Nationals)	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  less	  conservative	  than	  both	  the	  Labor	  Government	  and	  the	   Liberal–National	   Opposition	   on	   the	   prominent	   issues	   of	   unauthorised	   boat	  arrivals,	   climate	   change	   and	   marriage	   laws.	   How	   this	   plays	   out	   in	   government	  remains	  a	  question,	  even	  if	  in	  this	  respect	  that	  question	  often	  becomes	  reduced	  to	  a	  mathematical	   one.	   It	  would	  be	   a	  mistake	   to	   think	   this	   signals	   a	  definitive	  move	   in	  Australian	  politics.	  But	  it	  would	  be	  just	  as	  erroneous	  to	  not	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	   this	   uncanny	   unfolding,	   evident	   in	   far	  more	   than	   a	   finely	   balanced	   parliament.	  That	  the	  unpredictable	  reappeared	  in	  politics,	  in	  the	  immediate	  wake	  of	  what	  many	  regarded	  as	   the	  most	  boring	  election	   in	   recent	  memory,	   should	  give	  pause.	  This	   is	  not	   meant	   to	   suggest	   a	   renewed	   optimism	   or	   faith	   in	   government,	   structurally	  bound	  as	  it	  is	  to	  three-­‐year	  cycles	  of	  appointment	  and	  disappointment,	  or	  worse.	  It	  should,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   indicate	   a	   crucial	   distance	   between	   the	   policies	   of	  governments	  and	  politics	  in	  its	  broader,	  lived	  and	  untrammelled	  senses.	  If	  not	  quite	  cause	  for	  celebration,	  this	  gap	  nevertheless	  hints	  not—as	  is	  so	  easy	  to	  imagine—at	  the	  ongoing	  strength	  of	  various	  policies,	  but	  to	  their	  uncertain	  and	  incomplete	  reach.	  It	  is	  this	  distance,	  pointing	  as	  it	  does	  to	  a	  discrepancy	  between	  complex	  realities	  and	  political	  conventions,	  that	  elicits	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  uncanny.	  But	  there	  is	  something	  more	  specific	  than	  brittle	  norms	  in	  evidence,	  threading	  together	   the	   presumptions	   of	   migration	   and	   welfare	   policies,	   underwriting	  economics	  and	  shaping	  approaches	  to	  ecology,	  very	  much	  taken	  for	  granted	  and	  yet,	  for	   all	   that,	   boosted	   with	   hyperbole,	   subsidy	   and	   sentiment.	   Put	   simply,	   the	  argument	   here	   is	   that	   the	   familial	   household	   is	   both	   assumed	   and	   perturbed,	  presented	   as	   the	  model	   and	   situated	   as	   the	   object	   of	   government	   in	   each	  of	   these	  areas,	   a	   financialised	   version	   of	   a	   familiar	   orthodoxy	   at	   once	   economic,	   intimate,	  national,	   sexual	   and	   aesthetic.	   The	   appearance	   of	   the	   uncanny,	   in	   this	   reading,	  suggests	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  deeper	  conflict	  around	  these	  issues,	  even	  as	  it	  is	  rarely	  recognised	   as	   such	   in	   the	   canonical	   terms	   of	   political	   analysis.	   In	   order	   to	   make	  sense	  of	  this,	  the	  analytical	  and	  disciplinary	  boundaries	  between	  the	  cultural	  and	  the	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political,	  or	   the	  aesthetic	  and	  the	  economic,	  have	  to	  be	  traversed—just	  as,	   it	  might	  be	   noted,	   the	   figure	   of	   the	   uncanny	   points	   to	   their	   indistinction	   and,	   not	   least,	  because	  of	  the	  post-­‐Fordist	  centrality	  of	  the	  affective,	  the	  cultural	  and	  the	  household	  to	  financial	  processes,	  markets,	  work	  and	  political	  economy	  more	  generally.3	  	  More	  famously	  than	  ‘The	  Sandman’	  to	  which	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  uncanny	  has	  been	  traced,	  Freud’s	  1925	  essay	   ‘The	  Uncanny’	   (‘Das	  Unheimliche’)	   on	  Hoffmann’s	   short	  story	   defines	   heimliche	   as	   ‘belonging	   to	   the	   house,	   not	   strange,	   familiar,	   tame,	  intimate,	   friendly,	  etc.’4	  One	  does	  not	  have	  to	  follow	  Freud’s	  rather	  ahistorical	   take	  on	   the	  oedipal,5	   however,	   to	  discern	   the	   crucial	   insight	   that	   the	  uncanny	  discloses	  about	  the	  familial,	  the	  intimate	  and	  the	  household.	  The	  uncanny	  gathers	  around	  that	  which	   seems	  most	  mundane,	   yet	   imparts	   a	   feeling	   that	  what	   is	  most	   familiar	   is	   a	  matter	  of	  automation.	  It	  is	  a	  convention	  become	  so	  accustomed	  and	  passionless	  as	  to	  appear	  mechanical,	   bereft	  of	   emotional	   intensities	   and	  connection.	   It	   is	   the	  almost	  indefinable	  feeling	  that	  fact	  is	  manufactured.	  The	  field	  of	  the	  uncanny	  is	  at	  once	  odd	  and	   everyday.	   As	   Stanley	   Cavell	   put	   it,	   the	   uncanny	   is	   ‘the	   surrealism	   of	   the	  habitual’.6	   In	   its	   literary	  and	  cinematic	  genres,	  as	  with	   ‘The	  Sandman’,	   the	  uncanny	  has	   almost	   invariably	   assumed	   the	   character	   of	   a	   female	   robot.	   From	  Hoffmann’s	  Olympia,	  to	  the	  portrayal	  of	  the	  robot-­‐Maria	  in	  the	  1927	  German	  Expressionist	  film	  
Metropolis,	   to	   that	   of	   Six	   (and	   others)	   in	   the	   recent	   television	   series	   Battlestar	  
Galactica,	   the	   figure	   of	   the	   female	   robot	   (and	   cyborg)	   is	   positioned	   at	   the	   uneasy	  articulation	  between	  what	   is	  deemed	   to	  be	  natural	  and	   that	  which	   is	   construed	  as	  cultural.	  Yet,	  in	  its	  suggestion	  of	  an	  authenticity,	  however	  unsettled,	  such	  figures	  in	  their	   conventional	   form	   tend	   to	   reassert	   the	   sense	   that	   there	   is	   something	  natural	  before	   or	   beyond	   the	   processes	   of	   cultural	   artefaction.	   This	   is	   unsurprising,	   since	  women	  are	  often	  burdened	  with	  conveying	  the	  supposed	  essence	  of	  what	  is	  natural,	  the	   cultural	   markers	   of	   an	   ostensibly	   foundational	   biology	   and	   the	   naturalised	  reproduction	  of	   ‘life’	  situated	  as	  both	  fundament	  of	  and	  refuge	  against	  the	  putative	  degradations	  of	  technology,	  transaction	  and	  artifice.7	  And	  this,	  in	  brief,	  is	  the	  reason	  Donna	  Haraway,	   in	  writing	  her	   ‘ironic	  political	  myth’	  of	  the	  cyborg,	  opted	  not	  for	  a	  naturalist	   reconstitution	   of	   the	   demarcation	   between	   machine	   and	   human	   but	  argued	  instead	  for	  taking	  pleasure	  in	  the	  confusion,	  insisting	  that	  the	  ‘stakes	  in	  this	  border	  war	  have	  been	  the	  territories	  of	  production,	  reproduction	  and	  imagination.’8	  If	   Haraway’s	   intervention	   was	   oriented	   toward	   a	   critique	   of	   what	   might	   be	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construed	  as	  the	  properly	  natural	  space	  and	  demeanour	  of	  the	  feminine,	  alert	  to	  the	  industrialisation	   that	   had	   shaped	   both	   home	   and	   factory	   along	   with	   the	   very	  difference	   between	   them,9	   and	   therefore	   wary	   of	   the	   implications	   of	  sentimentalising	   the	   former,	   the	   present	   suggests	   no	   less	   attention	   to	   what	   the	  restoration	  of	  neatly	  gendered	  demarcations	  seek	  to	  call	  forth.	  In	  what	  follows,	  then,	  the	  argument	  is	  not	  that	  the	  art	  of	  government	  might	  be	  juxtaposed	  to	  some	  genuine	  realm	  of	  the	  everyday,	  or	  of	   life	  assumed	  to	  reside	  outside	  the	  volatile	  meshings	  of	  culture,	   technology,	   economics	   and	   politics,	   but	   that	   the	   uncanny	   signals	   the	  appearance	   of	   a	   new	   ‘border	   war’	   around	   the	   demarcation	   of	   what	   is	   properly	  political	   from	   that	   which	   is	   posited	   as	   natural	   and,	   consequently,	   regarded	   as	   an	  improper	  subject	  of	  cultural	  and	  political	  conflict.	  The	  uncanny	  would	  not	  be	  so	  if	  it	  did	   not,	   as	   Alison	   Landsberg	   has	   noted,	   deploy	   the	   premise	   of	   an	   authenticity	  disturbed.10	  Yet,	  in	  speaking	  directly	  (as	  Haraway	  contended)	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  vexed	   boundary	   between	   nature	   and	   culture,	   and	   in	   the	   sometimes	   ambivalent	  admixture	   of	   desire	   and	   anxiety	   that	   the	   uncanny	   elicits,	   it	   nevertheless	  simultaneously	  points	  to	  attempts	  to	  reimpose	  that	  demarcation	  in	  a	  new	  form	  and	  indicates	  that	  the	  boundary	  has	  not	  quite	  held	  as	  firmly	  as	  might	  be	  supposed.	  Put	   more	   precisely,	   the	   figure	   of	   woman-­‐robot	   has	   assumed	   a	   literary	   and	  psychoanalytic	   density	   as	   emblematic	   of	   complex	   shifts	   in	   sexuality,	   domesticity,	  gender,	  technology	  and	  work	  across	  the	  previous	  two	  centuries.	  Writing	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	   century,	   Hoffmann’s	   depiction	   of	   Olympia	   as	   the	   enticingly	   fatal	   robot	  not	  only	  took	  shape	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  an	  expanding	  industrialisation,	  in	  what	  Minsoo	  Kang	  has	  called	   the	  automaton	  craze	   that	   swept	  across	  Europe,	  and	  at	   the	  close	  of	   the	  Luddite	  campaigns	  against	   the	  mechanisation	  of	   the	  textile	   industry	   in	  England.11	  It	  took	  place	  at	  the	  very	  moment	  when	  the	  number	  of	  women	  in	  regular	  paid	   work—having	   increased	   most	   notably	   through	   and	   alongside	   the	  industrialisation	   of	   textile	   production—began	   to	   decline	   because	   of	   campaigns	   to	  remove	   women	   and	   children	   from	   the	   factory	   through	   so-­‐called	   protective	  legislation	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  family	  wage,	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  systems	  of	  day	  labour	   for	   women	   and	   an	   increasing	   dependance	   on	   male	   earnings	   defined	   as	   a	  ‘breadwinner’	  wage.12	  Set	   in	   the	  midst	  of	   these	  complex	  shifts	  between	  public	  and	  private	   labour,13	   the	   contested	   and	   gendered	   lines	   between	   paid,	   unpaid	   and	  precarious	   work,	   and	   the	   early	   association	   of	   mechanisation	   with	   the	   increasing	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economic	   independence	   of	   women,	   it	  might	   come	   as	   no	   surprise	   that	   Hoffmann’s	  story	  of	  the	  uncanny	  restores	  the	  properly	  familial	  by	  narrative’s	  end	  with	  a	  scene,	  as	  he	  puts	  it,	  of	  ‘quiet	  domestic	  happiness’.	  Following	  the	  work	  of	  Ivy	  Pinchbeck	  on	  this	  period,	  Sara	  Horrell	  and	  Jane	  Humphries	  note	  that	  these	  changes	  were	  ‘neither	  welcome	  nor	  understood	  by	   the	  men	  and	  women	  who	   lived	   through’	   them.14	  Even	  so,	   Hoffmann’s	   short	   story	   dramatised,	   in	   literary	   form,	   burgeoning	   fears	   and	  desires	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  what	  would	  become	  an	  almost	  global	   transition	  to	  the	   family	  wage	   over	   the	   next	   two	   centuries.	   Since	   the	   Harvester	   Judgment	   in	   Australia	   in	  1907,	  the	  basic	  wage	  has	  been	  more	  or	  less	  defined	  as	  a	  family	  wage	  paid	  to	  men	  as	  breadwinners.15	   In	  Metropolis,	   a	   critique	  of	   the	  expansion	  of	   the	  Fordist	  assembly-­‐line	   and	   the	   application	   of	   Taylorism	   of	   the	   early	   twentieth	   century	   is	   resolved	  through	   a	   return	   to	   the	   authentically	   feminine—the	   death	   of	   robot-­‐Maria	   and	   the	  return	   of	   real-­‐Maria—as	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   new,	   harmonious	   social	   contract	   between	  labour	  and	  capital.	   Indicative	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  German	  fascism,	  not	   least	   in	   its	   implicit	  anti-­‐Semitism,	   in	   its	   final	   sequence	   the	   film	   nevertheless	   serves	   as	   a	   striking	  anticipation	  of	  the	  Keynesian	  settlement	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  It	  might	  then	  be	  said	  that	  nascent	  but	  seismic	  shifts	  surface	  in	  stylised	  cultural	  forms	   well	   before	   they	   rise	   to	   prominence	   as	   matters	   of	   sustained	   sociocultural	  analysis	  or	  research.	  At	  present,	  the	  becoming	  everyday	  and	  intimately	  personal	  of	  programming,	   technology	   and	   automation16—and	   the	   associated	   expression	   of	  anxieties	   and	   desires	   that	   turn	   around	   the	   disrupted	   binaries	   of	   gender	   and	  sexuality,	  as	  much	  as	  they	  do	  those	  of	  organism	  and	  machine,	  or	  politics/aesthetics,	  or	   nature/culture—is	   similarly	   apparent	   in	   the	   slips	   between	   literature	   and	  electoral	   commentary.	   And,	   during	   the	   most	   recent	   federal	   election	   in	   Australia,	  journalists	   did,	   fleetingly	   but	   remarkably,	   become	   preoccupied	   with	   the	   literary	  device	   of	   the	   female	   robot.	   While	   Julia	   Gillard’s	   mechanical	   performance	   in	   the	  opening	  weeks	   of	   the	   election	   campaign	  was	  widely	   construed	   as	   an	   index	   of	   just	  how	  dull	  politics	  had	  become,	  its	  importance	  may	  well	  lie	  not	  in	  demonstrating	  the	  dominance	   of	   ‘machine	   party	   politics’	   but,	   more	   interestingly,	   in	   registering	   a	  significant	  moment	  of	  cognitive	  dissonance—even,	  as	   in	  this	   instance,	   in	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  herself	  as	  she	  articulated	  the	  Labor	  Party’s	  policies	  on	  border	  control,	  paid	  homage	  to	  working	  families	  and	  the	  dignity	  of	  labour,	  was	  compelled	  to	  prove,	  time	  and	  again,	   that	  she	  really	  did	  care	  about	  children.	  As	   the	  election	  campaign	  began,	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Jennifer	  Hewett,	  writing	  in	  the	  Australian,	  complained	  that	  ‘The	  PM’s	  firm	  and	  feisty	  image	  is	  being	  replaced	  by	  that	  of	  a	  hesitant,	  over-­‐rehearsed	  political	  robot.’17	  Paul	  Sheehan	  wrote	  of	  her	  as	  a	  ‘metallic	  creature	  of	  the	  machine’—from	  whom,	  according	  to	  him,	  the	  public	  had	  recoiled—in	  an	  article	  titled	  ‘In	  one	  month,	  a	  good	  woman	  has	  become	  Labor’s	   latest	  robot’.18	  The	  next	  day,	  Emma	  Chalmers	  noted,	  with	  manifest	  relief,	   the	  appearance	  of	   	   ‘a	   less	  robotic	  Ms	  Gillard’.19	  These	  references	  to	  a	  robotic	  Gillard	  had	  something	  to	  do	  with	  Tony	  Abbot’s	  repeated	  remarks	  about	  the	  ‘machine	  men’	  in	  the	  ALP,	  who	  had	  overthrown	  Kevin	  Rudd	  and	  installed	  Gillard	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party.	  They	  also	  echoed	  a	  longstanding	  attempt	  to	  depict	  her	  as	  bereft	  of	  proper	   (womanly)	   affect	   and	   attachments	   because	   she	   is	   neither	   married	   nor	   a	  mother.	  In	  2006	  and	  reiterated	  in	  2007,	  then-­‐Liberal	  Senator	  Bill	  Heffernan	  accused	  Gillard	  of	  being	   ‘deliberately	  barren’,	  and	  therefore	  unfit	  to	  hold	  office.20	  Heffernan	  was	   forced	   to	   apologise,	   though	   the	   implication	   that	   Gillard’s	   choices	   impair	   her	  representative	   standing	   remained	   in	   play.	   Mark	   Kenny,	   in	   an	   op-­‐ed	   piece	   for	   the	  
Adelaide	   Advertiser	   written	   just	   after	   Gillard’s	   ascendancy	   and	   almost	   a	   month	  before	  the	  election,	  accused	  parts	  of	  the	  media,	  the	  Liberal	  Party	  and	  someone	  from	  inside	  the	  ALP	  of	  being	  complicit	  in	  a	  campaign	  to	  deliver	  an	  ‘encrypted	  message	  …	  that	   Julia	  Gillard	   is	  a	   childless,	   career-­‐obsessed	   feminist,	  unmarried	  by	  choice,	   and	  not	   interested	   in	   the	   normal	   things	   such	   as	   children,	   families	   and	   the	   elderly’.	   He	  went	   on	   to	   note	   that	   this	   amounted	   to	   ‘a	   pitch-­‐perfect	   reinforcement	   of	   a	   pre-­‐existing	   conservative	   view	   about	   what	   women	   should	   think—assuming	   they	   are	  normal—and	   how	   they	   should	   carry	   themselves	   in	   politics’.21	   But	   the	   remarks	   by	  these	   journalists,	  while	   they	  certainly	  did	   this	  and	  more,	  giving	  a	  definitive	  nod	   to	  the	   derogatory	   and	   the	   normative,	   turned	   more	   explicitly	   on	   Gillard’s	   obvious	  aloofness.	   As	   Gillard’s	   polling	   declined	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   what	   was	   often	   a	   vicious	  campaign	  around	  the	  impending	  introduction	  of	  a	  carbon	  tax	  in	   late	  2011,	  another	  journalist	  remarked	  that	  ‘public	  opinion’	  viewed	  her	  as	  ‘somehow	  soulless’,	  while	  a	  second	  echoed	  this	  in	  concluding	  that	  this	  was	  ‘a	  problem	  which	  can	  only	  be	  fixed	  by	  acting	  and	  speaking	  naturally’.22	  In	  short,	  she	  seemed	  affectively	  detached	  from	  the	  policies	  she	  articulated.	  	  This,	  I	  come	  to	  suggest	  in	  concluding	  this	  essay,	  undoubtedly	  takes	  place	  within	  the	   register	   of	   the	   uncanny,	   illustrating	   the	   affective	   fault-­‐lines	   of	   the	   present	  moment.	  Hoffmann’s	  ultimate	  complaint	  about	  Olympia	  is	  that	  she	  does	  not	  express	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a	  naturally	  feminine	  affective	  range	  in	  voice	  and	  movement.	  Yet	  my	  concern	  here	  is	  neither	   to	  make	  an	  argument	   about	  or	   for	   ‘the	   real	   Julia	  Gillard’	   (Labor’s	   eventual	  riposte	  to	  the	  charge	  of	  mechanisation);23	  nor,	  quite,	  to	  argue	  that	  her	  politics	  might	  be	   less	   conservative	   than	   they	   appeared,	   and	   might	   therefore	   hold	   promise.	   Her	  depiction	   and	   presentation	   raises,	   I	   would	   suggest,	   a	   larger	   question	   about	   the	  specific	  and	  contested	  confluence	  of	  economics,	  politics	  and	  intimacy	  that	  might	  be	  called	   oikopolitical	   (the	   politics	   of	   the	   household).	   Economics,	   it	   might	   be	   noted,	  derives	   from	  oikonomia—that	   is,	   the	   law	  of	   the	  household;	   as	  does	  ecology.	  While	  the	  history	   of	   this	   concept	   can	  be	   traced	   to	  Aristotle’s	  moralising	  proposition	  of	   a	  properly	  productive	  household,24	  the	  present	  conjuncture	  is	  saturated	  by	  a	  politics	  in	   which	   nation,	   sexuality,	   gender,	   race	   and	   environment	   are	   all	   thought	   in	  
oikopolitical	   terms,	   and,	   more	   concisely,	   in	   terms	   that	   serve	   as	   bedrock	   for	  neoliberalism	   but	   also	   curiously	   remain	   intact	   as	   restrictive	   assumptions	   for	   its	  ostensible	   critics.	   The	  oikonomic	   adherence	  of	   government	  policy	   runs	   against	   the	  assumption,	   axiomatic	   for	   some	   on	   the	   Left,	   that	   capitalism	   (or	   its	   neoliberal	  variant)	  undermines	  the	  ostensibly	  natural	  or	  pre-­‐political	  bonds	  of	  family,	  race	  and	  nation.	   As	   argued	   elsewhere,	   this	   assumption	   does	   not	   correspond	   with	   the	  empirical	   flow	   of	   history;	   indeed,	   this	   law	   of	   the	   household	   serves	   as	   restorative	  fundament	   in	   times	   of	   crisis	   and	   scalable	   vector	   in	   moments	   of	   speculative	  expansion.25	  	  The	  concept	  of	  an	  oikopolitics	  is	  borrowed	  from	  Hannah	  Arendt.	  Writing	  in	  The	  
Human	   Condition,	   and	   having	   in	  mind	   not	   only	   the	   experience	   of	   fascism	   but	   also	  post-­‐war	  Keynesianism,	  for	  her	  this	  oikopolitics	  was	  discernible	  in	  the	  organisation	  of	  politics	  ‘in	  the	  image	  of	  a	  family	  whose	  everyday	  affairs	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  care	  of	  by	   a	   gigantic	   nationwide	   administration	   of	   housekeeping’.26	   Following	   Arendt,	  Elizabeth	   Povinelli	   has	   argued	   that	   such	   a	   politics	   hinges	   on	   the	   conflation	   of	  intimacy	   and	   genealogy	   that	   expanded	   with	   colonisation	   and	   which,	   in	   turn,	  organises	  and	  legitimates	  the	  distribution	  of	  goods,	  services,	  welfare	  and	  property.27	  For	  my	  part,	  I	  would	  add	  that	  the	  genealogical	  and	  its	  oikonomic	  correlates	  are	  the	  lynchpins	  of	  private	  property,	  its	  transmission	  and	  rights,	  and	  so	  the	  critical	  element	  in	  the	  perseverance	  of	  capitalism	  across	  time	  and	  space.28	  This	  analytical	  paradigm	  goes	  beyond	  the	  theoretical	  impasse	  of	  thinking	  historical	  processes	  as	  if	  they	  are	  a	  consequence	   of	   already-­‐given,	   discrete	   identities,	   whether	   those	   of	   class,	   race,	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gender	  or	  sexuality.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  delves	  into	  the	  racialising,	  sexual,	  national	  and	  gendered	  conditions	  that	  constitute	  and	  reconfigure	  biopolitical	  re-­‐/production.	  Yet	  while	  an	  oikopolitics	  can	  be	  made	  out	  in	  its	  varied	  articulations	  across	  more	  than	  two	   centuries,	   evident	   in	   the	   swings	   that	   saw	   women	   enter	   and	   exit	   particular	  occupations;	   in	   the	   affiliated	   architectures	   and	   domestic	   semantics	   of	   home,	  workplace,	   and	  nation;	   in	  marriage	   laws	   that	   banned	   ‘miscegenation’	   or	   sought	   to	  ‘breed	  out	  the	  colour’;	   in	  the	  emergence	  of	  migration	  policies	  based	  on	  legitimated	  genealogical	   lines—the	   current	   tension	   consists	   more	   specifically	   in	   the	  indistinction	  between	  intimacy	  and	  economy	  that	  plays	  out,	  among	  other	  things,	  as	  the	   expectation	   that	  women	  who	  work	   (whether	   in	  private	  or	  public,	   paid	  or	  not)	  deliver	   a	   labour	   that	   has	   affective	   purchase,	   circulating	   as	   an	   extension	   of	   (rather	  than	   refusal	   of	   or	   indifference	   toward)	   care-­‐giving	   domestic	   labour	   that	   has	   to	  appear	  as	  if	  it	  is	  not	  work	  at	  all,	  but	  freely	  and	  naturally	  given.29	  	  It	  comes	  down,	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  the	  extension	  of	  surplus	  labour—though	  not	  perhaps	  in	  exactly	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Karl	  Marx	  acknowledged	  it.30	  This	  surplus	  and	  its	   channelling—its	   distribution	   along	   and	   through	   oikonomic	   lines—is	   the	   key	   to	  understanding	   the	   coincidence	   of	   austerity	   at	   a	   time	   of	   abundance.31	   The	   present	  
oikonomic	   configuration	   turns	   on	   the	   privatisation	   of	   welfare,	   health	   care	   and	  education	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  that,	  along	  with	  the	  relative	  stagnation	  of	  wages	  and	  restructuring	  of	  the	  workplace	  over	  a	  similar	  period,	  constituted	  the	  household	  as	   the	   basis	   (rather	   unsteady	   as	   it	   happens)	   of	   financialisation.	   In	   2005,	   the	  International	  Monetary	   Fund	   noted	   that	   the	   finance	   sector	   had	   displaced	   its	   risks	  onto	   households,	   remarking	   (hoping)	   that	   the	   household	   would	   act	   as	   its	   ‘shock	  absorber	   of	   last	   resort’.32	   The	   so-­‐called	   turn	   to	   neoliberalism	   amounted	   to	   the	  household	   becoming	   the	   tense	   locus	   of	   personalised	   risk	   management,	  indebtedness,	  welfare	  provision	  and	   the	  expansion	  of	  unpaid	   labour.	  Furthermore,	  by	   far	   the	   greater	   proportion	   of	   work	   in	   Australia	   is	   in	   healthcare,	   education,	  hospitality,	  public	  administration,	  financial	  services,	  recreation,	  and	  retailing.	  That	  is	  to	   say,	  while	   the	  gap	  between	  men’s	  and	  women’s	   incomes	  has	  grown	   in	  previous	  years	   because	   of	   the	   mining	   boom,	   most	   employment	   is	   in	   areas	   that	   involve	   an	  element	  of	  personal	  (that	   is,	  affective)	   interaction,	  and	  which	  (particularly	   in	  retail	  and	   hospitality)	   are	   increasingly	   precarious.	   With	   the	   decline	   of	   welfare,	   the	  privatisation	  of	  education,	   the	   introduction	  of	   compulsory	  private	  superannuation,	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and	   the	   shift	   to	   commercialised	   health	   care,	   housing	   increasingly	   assumed	   the	  additional	  roles	  of	  collateral,	  investment,	  insurance	  and	  safety	  net.	  More	  broadly,	  the	  household	  was	   located	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   a	   financial	   complex	   that	   sought	   to	   diffuse	  risk,	   organise	   its	   management	   and	   enforce	   the	   intimate	   expectations	   of	   human	  capital	   formation.	  As	  Michael	  Rafferty	  and	  Serena	  Yu	  argued	   in	   their	   report	   to	   the	  Australian	   Council	   of	   Trade	  Unions,	   the	  most	   recent	   financial	   crisis	   ‘revealed	   how	  much	  more	  all	  workers	  and	  households	  are	  integrated	  into	  financial	  processes	  and	  calculations	   in	   their	   everyday	   life,	   a	   process	   coming	   to	   be	   known	   as	  “financialization”’.33	  	  But	   however	   pronounced	   this	   oikopolitical	   assemblage	   is,	   it	   goes	   against	   the	  trend	   of	   lived	   realities.	   Put	   another	   way,	   the	   demand	   for	   genuinely	   normative	  affective	   performance	   would	   not	   be	   quite	   so	   dogmatic	   were	   the	   oikonomic	  arrangements	   that	   underwrite	   the	   economy	   assured.	   The	   discrepancy	   is	   all-­‐important.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   there	   is	   the	   exaggerated	   repertoire	   of	   current	  policy:	  border	  control,	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  Working	  Family,	  the	  Intervention	  (that	  is,	  the	  Northern	  Territory	  Emergency	  Response,	   and	   further	   changes	   to	  welfare),	   the	  financial	   crisis,	   and	   climate	   change.	   These	   are	   all	   approached	   as	   instances	   of	  household	  management,	   replete	  with	  claims	  about	   filiation,	  merit	  and	  genealogical	  right.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  are	  the	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  how	  people	  live,	  most	  easily	  situated	  from	  the	  1970s	  on,	  that	  indicate	  the	  object	  of	  the	  these	  policies	  but	  also	  the	  scope	   of	   their	   inoperability.	   Still,	   mainstream	   economic	   (and	   ecological)	  perspectives	  demand	  adherence	  to	  their	  etymological	  foundation	  in	  the	  oikos	  at	  the	  very	  moment	  of	  the	  household’s	  most	  striking	  incertitude.	  Detailed	  attention	  given	  to	   Gillard’s	   living	   arrangements	   betray	   a	   rather	   traditional	   view	   of	   women	   and	  politics	   among	   some.	   But	   the	   way	   in	   which	   her	   decisions	   have	   been	   regarded	   as	  suspect	   points	   to	   a	  wider	   context	   in	  which	   gender,	   nation,	   sexuality	   and	   race	   are	  routinely	  combined	  to	  prove	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  problem	  regarded	  as	  self-­‐evident.	  A	  statistical	  catalogue	  of	  declining	  rates	  of	  marriage,	  shorter	  marriages,	  rising	  divorce,	  dropping	   childbirths	   and	   changes	   to	   household	   composition	   is	   presented	   as	   the	  signal	  of	  a	  failure	  to	  reproduce	  the	  nation,	  and	  here	  re-­‐/production	  is	  understood	  in	  its	   simultaneously	   economic,	   racial	   and	   sexual	   senses.	   The	   presumption	   that	   this	  marks	  a	  failure,	  and	  of	  what,	   is	  hardly	  ever	  explored,	   let	  alone	  challenged.	  In	  2004,	  then-­‐Treasurer	  Peter	  Costello	  suggested,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  government	  that	  had	   insisted	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on	  violently	  stopping	  unauthorised	  migration,	  that	  women	  should	  have	  three	  babies	  to	   ostensibly	   stem	   the	   decline	   in	   Australia’s	   population.	   In	   2006,	   a	   news	   report	  carried	   Costello’s	   boast	   in	   these	   terms:	   ‘Australian	   women	   appear	   to	   have	  succumbed	   to	   Treasurer	   Peter	   Costello’s	   charms,	   taking	   up	   his	   challenge	   to	   have	  more	  babies	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  nation’.34	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  after	  years	  of	  changes	  to	  tax	  and	  employment	  policies	  that,	  as	  Deborah	  Brennan	  has	  shown,	  expressed	  ‘hostility	  towards	   mothers’	   workforce	   participation’.35	   In	   any	   event,	   statistical	   projections	  continue	  to	  forecast	  either	  static	  or	  declining	  birthrates,36	  irrespective	  of	  any	  recent	  panic	  about	  overpopulation	  that	  amounts	  to	  a	  racialising	  displacement	  of	  problems	  to	   do	   with	   transport,	   urban	   planning,	   incomes,	   housing	   and	   energy.	   As	   Jacques	  André	  put	   it	   in	  another	  context:	   ‘the	  racial	  question	   is	   from	  start	   to	   finish	  a	  sexual	  question’.37	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   implicitly	   racialised	   and	   heteronormative	  assumptions	   of	   demography—which	   draw	   a	   cultural	   and	   legal	   line	   between	  population	   and	   citizenship	   founded	   on	   the	   characterisation	   of	   nation	   as	   familial	  home—and	  the	  national	  configuration	  of	   the	  environment	  have	  been	  accompanied	  by	   climate	   change	   policies	   rarely	   criticised	   for	   placing	   the	   greatest	   burdens	   on	  households,	  not	   least	  by	   increasing	  the	  amount	  of	   (still	   largely	   female	  and	  unpaid)	  domestic	   labour	   that	   goes	   into	   schemes	   with	   little	   discernible	   environmental	  benefit.38	   Yet	   if	   ‘[g]ood	   environmental	   stewardship’	   has	   been	   recently	   defined	   by	  mainstream	   ecologists	   as	   akin	   to	   ‘good	   household	   management’	   (as	   did	   Andrew	  Simms,	   the	   author	   of	  Ecological	  Debt,	   echoing	  Margaret	   Thatcher’s	   homilies	   about	  household	  economics)39	  such	  analogies	  have	  become	  that	  much	  tighter	  in	  migration	  and	  welfare.	  In	  effect,	  what	  these	  moves	  accomplish	  is	  the	  depoliticisation	  of	  cultural	  and	  economic	  practices,	  relocating	  the	  pertinent	  questions	  to	  the	  naturalised	  terms	  of	  an	  oikonomics:	  family,	  race,	  nation,	  heterosexuality,	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  each	  in	  their	  inseparable	  arrangement.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  not	  necessary,	  here,	  to	  rehearse	  in	  detail	  the	  ways	  nations	  and	  the	  distribution	   of	   right	   are	   thought	   along	   genealogical	   lines.40	  What	  may	   need	   to	   be	  stressed	   is	   that	   the	  measures	   of	   the	   Australian	  Northern	   Territory	   Intervention—undermining	   of	   communal	   landholdings,	   banning	   pornography	   and	   alcohol,	  authoritarian	   and	   punitive	   changes	   to	   welfare—are	   indeed	   disciplinary	   as	   many	  have	   argued,	   but	   they	   are	   not	   simply	   biopolitical,	   as	  Dinesh	  Wadiwel	   and	  Deirdre	  Tedmanson	   suggest;41	   rather,	   their	   specificity	   is	   oikonomic.	   As	   Nicole	   Watson	  
Angela Mitropoulos—Uncanny Robots and Affective Labour	   163 
pointed	  out,	  the	  Intervention	  was	  driven	  not	  only	  by	  the	  ‘criminalisation	  of	  poverty,’	  but	  also	  by	  an	   ‘obsession	  with	  home	  ownership.’42	  The	  Intervention	  has	  at	   its	  core	  the	   imposition	   of	   an	   oikopolitics	   at	   its	   most	   normative:	   the	   enforcement	   of	   rules	  regarding	   proper	   household	  management,	   the	   determination	   of	   legitimate	   lines	   of	  obligation	   and	   interdependency,	   decrees	   of	   the	   at	   once	   properly	   familial	   and	  decently	   productive,	   for	   the	  most	   part	   through	   the	  much-­‐touted	   virtue	   of	   private	  home	   ownership.	   As	   Indigenous	   people	   became	   in	   this	   instance	   the	   apparently	  effortless	  laboratory	  for	  more	  recent	  changes	  to	  welfare,43	  the	  path	  from	  welfare	  to	  workfare	  to	  normfare	  can	  be	  traced,	  locally,	  to	  the	  Keating	  Government’s	  adoption	  of	  mutual	  obligation	  policies	  and,	  globally,	   to	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Working	  Family	   in	  Labor	  and	  Democrat	  approaches	   in	   the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Australia	  and	   the	  United	  States.	  Emphasising	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   family	   came	   to	   be	   overtly	   posited	   as	   a	   re-­‐/productive	  unit,	  and	  by	  implication	  accentuating	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  deserving	  poor	  as	   a	   genealogical	  matter,	   the	  Working	   Family	   is	   as	  much	   about	   economics	   as	   it	   is	  about	   the	   oikonomic	   nexus	   of	   sex,	   race,	   class,	   citizenship	   and	   gender,	   the	  making	  intimate	  of	  the	  injunction	  to	  be	  properly	  productive	  and	  virtuously	  reproductive.	  In	  Australia,	   the	   normatively	   gendered	   demand	   to	   deliver	   up	   gratuitous	   labour	  referred	   to	   earlier	   takes	   place	  within	   the	   steady	   rise	   of	  what,	   in	   recent	  Australian	  history,	   Holly	   Randell-­‐Moon	   has	   highlighted	   as	   the	   intersection	   of	   Christian	  nationalism	   with	   neoliberalism,	   and	   what	   Barbara	   Baird	   has	   analysed	   as	   the	  increasing	  merging	  of	  a	  politics	  of	  familial	  and	  national	  reproduction	  as	  it	  pivots	  on	  the	  figure	  of	  childhood	  innocence.44	  Yet	  nowhere,	  perhaps,	  have	  these	  conjunctures	  of	   racial,	   sexual	   and	   economic	   policies	   been	   more	   apparent	   than	   in	   Bill	   Clinton’s	  
Personal	   Responsibility,	  Work	   Opportunity	   and	  Medicaid	   Restructuring	   Act	   of	   1996.	  Those	   laws	   declared	   that	   ‘marriage	   is	   the	   foundation	   of	   a	   successful	   society’,	  outlining	   a	   series	   of	   mostly	   punitive	   measures	   to	   give	   effect	   to	   this,	   while	   also	  barring	   (legal)	   migrants	   from	   welfare.	   This,	   of	   course	   was	   the	   same	   year	   of	   the	  
Defense	   of	   Marriage	   Act;	   the	   same	   year	   Clinton	   passed	   laws	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	  militarisation	  of	  the	  US-­‐Mexican	  border	  and	  a	  predictable	  escalation	  of	  deaths.45	  As	  Rafferty	   has	   indicated	   of	   recent	   proposed	   changes	   to	   welfare	   policy	   in	   Australia,	  announced	  by	  Gillard	   in	  a	  speech	  entitled	   ‘The	  Dignity	  of	  Work,’	   these	   ‘brought	  an	  international	  movement	  to	  restructure	  welfare	  to	  full	  bloom	  in	  Australia’.	  According	  to	  Rafferty,	   both	   sides	  of	  politics	   in	  Australia	   ‘have	  made	   it	   clear	   that	   they	  believe	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that	  the	  moral	  failure	  of	  having	  a	  baby	  out	  of	  wedlock,	  or	  in	  your	  teens,	  can	  only	  be	  redeemed	  by	  paid	  work’.46	  In	  any	  event,	  that	  both	  the	  Gillard	  Labor	  Government	  and	  the	  Greens	  (led	  by	  an	  openly	  gay	  man)	  have	  felt	  obliged	  to	  amend	  the	  detention	  of	  unauthorised	  migrants	  only	  insofar	  as	  this	  impacts	  upon	  families	  with	  children	  may	  well	  ease	  the	  distress	  caused	  to	  some	  of	  those	  who	  are	  extrajudicially	  detained.	  But	  why	   are	   those	   who	   are	   married	   and	   with	   children	   seen	   as	   more	   deserving	   of	  freedom	   by	   parties	  whose	   leaders	   are	   anything	   but?	   The	   discrepancies	   should	   be	  more	  than	  apparent.	  As	  Misha	  Schubert	  suggested	  recently,	  Gillard’s	  stated	  position	  against	  gay	  marriage	  doesn’t	  ‘ring	  true’.47	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  these	  are	  politicians,	  such	  as	  Clinton	   and	   Gillard,	   who	   pronounce	   support	   for	   policies	   whose	   assumptions	   they	  themselves	  do	  not,	  in	  their	  actual	  daily	  practices	  and	  choices,	  seem	  to	  share.	  This	  is	  not	   a	   simple	   instance	   of	   hypocrisy.	   Having	   assumed	   the	   task	   of	   representing	   the	  nation,	  the	  rest	  unfolds	  as	  if	  inexorably.	  Nations	  are	  habitually	  considered	  as	  the	  larger	  cognate	  of	  the	  family.	  Drawing	  the	   boundary	   of	   politics,	   but	   also	   defining	   what	   is	   deemed	   to	   be	   natural	   as	   that	  which	  lies	  beyond	  political	  dispute,	  the	  analogy	  is	  nevertheless	  mutually	  constitutive	  of	   a	   depoliticisation.	   While	   construing	   the	   nation	   in	   familial	   terms	   seeks	   to	  naturalise	   its	   boundaries,	   buttressing	   it	   with	   assumptions	   of	   biological	   origin,	   the	  history	  of	  marriage	  laws	  illustrates	  that	  this	  supposedly	  natural	  basis	  is	  similarly	  an	  artefact,	   a	   consequence	   of	   laws	   and	   conventions.	   It	   is	   marriage	   laws	   which	   have	  legitimated	   offspring	   and	   created	   illegitimacy,	   determined	   the	   transmission	   of	  wealth	   and	   excluded	  others	   from	   it,	   legalised	  particular	   forms	  of	   interdependency	  while	   criminalising	   others,	   reduced	   sexuality	   to	   two	   and	   defined	   it	   as	   a	   matter,	  above	  all,	  of	  property.	  The	  legal	  fiction	  of	  property,	  in	  turn,	  is	  assumed	  to	  flow	  from	  the	  rights	  conferred	  by	  genealogical	  lines	  of	  descent	  (a	  property	  of	  what	  is	  proper)	  rather	   than	  convention.	  The	  significance	  of	   the	   recent	  passage	  of	  marriage	   laws	   in	  Australia	   (as	   in	   the	  United	  States),	   characterising	  marriage	   in	   strictly	  heterosexual	  terms	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   history,	   is	   not	   quite	   at	   odds	  with	   proposed	   regulations	  governing	  civil	  unions.	  To	   the	  extent	   that	  provisions	  of	   the	   latter	  dictate	  exclusive,	  monogamous	   couplings	   (as	   Sydney	   City	   Council	   recently	   set	   forth),	   the	   question	  these	   laws	   answer	   is	   not	   only	   that	   of	   sexuality	   or	   intimacy	   (though	   the	   model	  remains	   heteronormative),	   but	  what	   legitimate	   sexual	   connection	   should	   result	   in	  and	   be:	   namely,	   the	   familial	   ordering	   and	   transfer	   of	   property.	   Changes	   to	   tax,	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insurance	  and	  similar	  policies	  might	  have	  recognised	  same-­‐sex	  couples,	  but	  in	  effect	  this	  means	  that	  sharing	  material	  resources	  with	  anyone	  other	  than	  one	  other	  person	  on	  these	  terms	  is	  penalised	  or	  ruled	  out.	  As	  Priya	  Kandaswamy	  put	  it	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	   gay	   marriage	   and	   racism,	   the	   state	   ‘recognizes	   a	   very	   particular	   kind	   of	  relationship	   in	   its	   recognition	  of	   gay	  marriage,	   a	   relationship	   that	   is	   structured	  by	  the	  idiom	  of	  property’.48	  Marriage	  makes	  property	  arrangements	  and	  their	  transfer	  legible,	  literally	  reproducing	  the	  inequalities	  of	  class	  and	  race	  as	  if	  they	  are	  a	  result	  of	   biological	   attachment.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   insecurity	   that	   has	   been	   amplified	   by	  decades	  of	   neoliberalism	   invests	  marriage	  with	   ever	   greater	   import,	   not	   least	   in	   a	  context	  where	  financial	  calculation	  becomes	  an	  increasingly	  intimate	  matter,	  where	  familial	  ties	  become	  the	  very	  condition	  of	  migration,	  of	  health	  care,	  or	  education	  and	  so	  on.	  Neoliberalism	  does	  not,	  then,	  fragment	  the	  putatively	  natural	  attachments	  of	  family,	   nation	   and	   race.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   it	   literally	   widens	   and	   deepens	   their	  affective	  purchase.	  Still,	  laws	  such	  as	  those	  of	  the	  Marriage	  Act	  would	  not	  be	  deemed	  necessary	   if	   intimacy	  was	  not,	  as	   it	  happens,	  becoming	  a	  more	  complex	  matter	   for	  many,	   increasingly	   something	   other	   than	   life-­‐long,	   monogamous	   and/or	  heteronormative	  arrangements,	  whether	  queer	  or	  straight.	  The	  conventional	  model	  of	  intimacy	  was,	  to	  put	  it	  schematically,	  the	  accompaniment	  of	  a	  period	  and	  type	  of	  industrial	   production.	   Life-­‐long	   attachment	   to	   a	   particular	   occupation	   and/or	  employer	  was,	  in	  its	  early	  Fordist	  days,	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  relatively	  higher	  family	  wage	  granted	  to	  husbands	  and	  fathers.	  	  In	   any	   case,	   recent	   analyses	   of	   work,	   of	   its	   transformation	   and	   significant	  aspects	   over	   the	   last	   two	   decades,	   turn	   around	   the	   key	   themes	   of	   affect	   and	  precariousness.	  Post-­‐Fordism	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  meshing	  of	  worktime	  and	  the	  time	  of	  life,	   the	   demand	   to	   be	   constantly	   available,	   always	   preparing	   for	   work.49	   Social	  networking	   is	   also	   net-­‐working.50	   Particularly	   in	   the	   still-­‐feminised	   occupations	   of	  care	  and	  service	  work,	  in	  the	  expanding	  post-­‐Fordist	  areas	  of	  the	  economy,	  with	  its	  own	   particular	   exertions,	   fatigue	   and	   forms	   of	   an	   oftentimes	   intimate	   self-­‐management,	   it	   is	   affects	   that	   are	   put	   to	   work.	   Akseli	   Virtanen,	   Paolo	   Virno	   and	  others	   have	   theorised	   affective	   labour	   as	   the	   valorisation	   of	   human	   sociability	   as	  such.51	   Setting	   aside	   an	   easy	   distinction	   between	   human	   and	   machine,	   Patricia	  Clough	   et	   al	   argue	   ‘that	   there	   is	   an	   abstracting	   of	   affect	   to	   affect-­‐itself,	   which	  disregards	   the	   bounded-­‐ness	   of	   the	   human	   body,	   thus	   troubling	   the	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conceptualization	  of	  the	  body	  as	  the	  body-­‐as-­‐organism’.52	  Along	  similar	  lines,	  Kathi	  Weeks	   has	   insisted	   that	   there	   is	   an	   impasse	   in	   presenting	   ‘a	   true	   self	   versus	   its	  estranged	   form,	   or	   a	   reproductive	   sphere	   of	   practice	   separate	   from	   a	   sphere	   of	  properly	   capitalist	   production’.53	   The	   divergence	   between	   these	   two	   accounts	   is	  significant,	   not	   least	   because	   the	   latter	   presume	   a	   feminist,	   anti-­‐racist	   and	   queer	  critical	  history	  leery	  of	  the	  implicit	  proposition,	  in	  Virno’s	  account	  and	  that	  of	  others,	  of	   nature	  deformed	  by	   cultural	   and	   economic	  processes.	  That	   said,	   as	   I	   have	  been	  arguing,	  it	  is	  not	  authentic	  human	  sociability	  that	  is	  valorised	  in	  affective	  labour,	  but	  the	   apparently	   genuine	   circulation	   of	   affect	   as	   if	   it	   is	   not	   work.	   Affective	   labour,	  whether	  paid	  or	  not,	  has	  long	  circulated	  as	  part	  of	  a	  compensatory	  logic,	  offered	  as	  a	  humanisation	  of	  the	  mechanisation	  of	  the	  labour	  process,	  in	  both	  Fordism	  and	  post-­‐Fordism.	   In	   this	   respect,	   it	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   question	   of	   lamenting	   the	   indistinction	  between	  life	  and	  work	  as	  if	  the	  former	  might	  offer	  refuge,	  but	  of	  noting	  the	  ways	  in	  which	   a	   politics	   of	   the	   re-­‐enchantment	   of	   life	   proceeds	   alongside	   the	   infinite	  expansion	   of	   worktime.	   Melinda	   Cooper,	   in	   her	   discussion	   of	   the	   complex	  articulations	   of	   neoliberalism	   and	   anti-­‐abortion	   politics	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   has	  suggested	   that	   fundamentalism	   emerged	   here	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   ‘reimpose	   the	  property	   form	   in	   and	   over	   an	   uncertain	   future’,	   a	   form	   that	   ‘as	   the	   right-­‐to-­‐life	  movement	   makes	   clear,	   is	   inextricably	   economic	   and	   sexual,	   productive	   and	  reproductive.	   It	   is	   ultimately	   a	   claim	   over	   the	   bodies	   of	   women’.54	   What	   I	   would	  emphasise	  is	  that	  the	  incertitude	  of	  property	  rights	  is	  resolved	  through	  recourse	  to	  genealogical	   inscription.55	   Moreover,	   oikonomia	   legitimates	   the	   distribution	   of	  surplus	  labour.	  It	  is,	  then,	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  reinstating	  a	  ‘work–life	  balance’,	  inasmuch	  as	  that	  restoration	  might	  be	  tacitly	  understood	  as,	  or	  in	  practice	  entail,	  the	  return	  of	  (largely)	  women’s	  time	  to	  unpaid	  domestic	  work	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  life.56	  Nor	  would	   it	   be	   a	   matter	   of	   denouncing	   the	   enslavement	   that	   is	   implied	   by	   the	  indistinction	  of	  worktime	  and	  that	  of	  life,	  as	  if	  unpaid	  and	  poorly	  paid	  labour	  has	  not	  always	   been	   the	   precondition	   of	   the	   circumscribed	   ‘normal	   working	   day’.57	   The	  expansion	  of	  precarious	  work,	   the	   increasingly	  widespread	  predicament	  of	   infinite	  worktime	   that	   has	   overtaken	   the	   demarcations	   between	   life	   and	   labour	   need	   not	  play	  out,	  once	  again,	  as	  the	  naturalised	  allocation	  of	  surplus	  labour	  along	  oikonomic	  lines.	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Nevertheless,	  given	  the	  indistinction	  between	  worktime	  and	  the	  time	  of	  life,	  the	  question	   of	   how	  workers	   might	   take	   (what	   might	   be	   redundantly	   referred	   to	   as)	  industrial	  action	  becomes	  both	  more	  difficult	   to	  answer	  and	  all	   the	  more	  pressing.	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  is	  a	  more	  complex	  story	  to	  be	  told	  about	  both	  affective	  labour	  and	  precarious	   work,	   not	   least	   because	   these	   are	   hardly	   new,	   even	   if	   they	   are	   new	  experiences	   for	   some;	   and	   even	   as	   they	   emerge	   as	   novel	  motifs	   in	   social	   analysis,	  likely	  because	  over	  the	   last	   two	  decades	  these	   forms	  of	  work	  have	  come	  to	   impact	  upon	  the	  experience	  of	  work	  for	  white,	  middle-­‐class	  men	  in	  metropolitan	  countries.	  Still,	   the	  question	  of	  what	   to	  do	  when	   the	   strike	  becomes	  structurally	   implausible,	  when	   workers	   are	   spatially	   and	   temporally	   disaggregated,	   or	   when	   the	   work	  contract	   is	  both	  precarious	  and	  infinite	   in	   its	  reach,	  becomes	  a	  more	  pertinent	  one	  for	   all	   that.	   My	   conclusion	   here	   is	   that	   given	   the	   pertinence	   of	   (faking)	   affective	  attachment,	  what	  becomes	  increasingly	  troubling	  is	  precisely	  that	  which	  Gillard	  was	  accused	   of.	   In	   The	   Managed	   Heart,	   Arlie	   Russell	   Hochschild,	   remarking	   on	   the	  strategies	   some	   flight	   attendants	   use	   when	   confronted	   with	   speed-­‐ups,	   wrote:	  ‘Workers	  who	   refuse	   to	  perform	  emotional	   labor	   are	   said	   to	   “go	   into	   robot”.	  They	  pretend	   to	   show	   some	   feeling.	   [Yet	   in]	   the	   conditions	   of	   speed-­‐up	   and	   slowdown,	  covering	   up	   a	   lack	   of	   genuine	   feeling	   is	   no	   longer	   considered	   necessary.	   Half-­‐heartedness	   has	   gone	   public.’58	   Perhaps,	   then,	   the	   oikos	   is	   haunted	   not	   by	  communism—at	  least	  as	  it	  has	  come	  to	  be	  understood,	  as	  party	  or	  state	  or	  policy—but	   by	   disaffection,	   a	   detachment	   from	   the	   oikonomic	   that	   signals	   attachments	  otherwise	  and,	  for	  this	  reason,	  barely	  deciphered	  by	  conventional	  political	  analyses,	  but	  nevertheless	  distinctly	  uncanny.	  	   —	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  a	  realm	  of	  private,	  familial	  affection	  that,	  in	  any	  event,	  allowed	  for	  the	  humanisation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  the	  male	  domination	  of	  the	  latter.	  In	  the	  Fordist	  period	  of	  much	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  this	  distinction	  was	  formalised	  in	  the	  accounting	  of	  the	  family	  wage	  (on	  this,	  see	  my	  ‘Oikopolitics,	  and	  Storms’,	  The	  Global	  South,	  vol.	  3,	  no.	  1,	  2009,	  pp.	  66–82).	  The	  feminist	  campaigns	  from	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  on,	  around	  equal	  pay,	  unpaid	  domestic	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  work,	  divorce	  laws,	  contraception	  and	  abortion,	  highlighted	  (among	  other	  things)	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Fordist	  demarcation	  of	  production	  and	  reproduction	  was	  mutually	  constitutive.	  Post-­‐Fordism,	  by	  contrast,	  situates	  the	  affective,	  the	  household	  and	  reproduction	  at	  the	  very	  centre	  of	  markets,	  finance	  and	  politics	  (see	  note	  3).	  8	  Haraway,	  ‘A	  Cyborg	  Manifesto’,	  p.	  292.	  9	  Kerreen	  M.	  Reiger,	  The	  Disenchantment	  of	  the	  Home:	  Modernizing	  the	  Australian	  Family	  1880–1940,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Melbourne,	  1985.	  10	  Alison	  Landsberg,	  ‘Prosthetic	  Memory:	  Total	  Recall	  and	  Bladerunner’,	  in	  Bell	  and	  Kennedy	  (eds),	  
The	  Cybercultures	  Reader,	  p.	  195.	  11	  Minsoo	  Kang,	  Sublime	  Dreams	  of	  Living	  Machines:	  The	  Automaton	  in	  the	  European	  Imagination,	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  Mass.,	  2010,	  p.	  174.	  On	  the	  Luddites,	  see	  ‘The	  Declaration	  of	  the	  Framework	  Knitters’	  [1812],	  <www.marxists.org/history/england/combination-­‐laws/ned-­‐ludd-­‐1812.htm>.	  12	  Sara	  Horrell	  and	  Jane	  Humphries,	  ‘Women’s	  Labour	  Force	  Participation	  and	  the	  Transition	  to	  the	  Male-­‐Breadwinner	  Family,	  1790–1865’,	  Economic	  History	  Review,	  vol.	  48,	  no.	  1,	  1995,	  pp.	  89–117.	  	  13	  For	  much	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  in	  Europe,	  most	  textile	  production	  was	  undertaken	  in	  the	  household	  by	  women.	  14	  Horrell	  and	  Humphries,	  p.	  89.	  15	  As	  Gillian	  Whitehouse	  suggested	  of	  early	  Australian	  wage	  determination,	  the	  protectionist	  measures	  of	  the	  family	  wage,	  along	  with	  the	  White	  Australia	  policy	  and	  legislation	  pertaining	  to	  Indigenous	  and	  Pacific	  labourers,	  meant	  that	  protection	  applied	  largely	  to	  white	  men.	  ‘Justice	  and	  Equity:	  Women	  and	  Indigenous	  Workers’,	  in	  Stuart	  Macintyre	  and	  Joseph	  Ezra	  Isaac	  (eds),	  The	  New	  Province	  for	  Law	  And	  
Order:	  100	  Years	  of	  Australian	  Industrial	  Conciliation	  and	  Arbitration,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2004,	  pp.	  207–40.	  16	  This	  essay	  is	  not,	  however,	  an	  extended	  discussion	  of	  information	  technologies,	  though	  it	  remains	  implicit.	  On	  this,	  see	  Susan	  Hawthorne	  and	  Renate	  Klein	  (eds),	  Cyberfeminism:	  Connectivity,	  Critique	  
and	  Creativity,	  Spinifex	  Press,	  Melbourne,	  1999;	  and	  Zoë	  Sofoulis,	  ‘Virtual	  Corporeality:	  A	  Feminist	  Perspective’,	  Australian	  Feminist	  Studies,	  vol.	  15,	  1992,	  pp.	  11–24.	  17	  Australian,	  31	  July	  2010.	  18	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  2	  August	  2010.	  19	  Herald	  Sun,	  3	  August	  2010.	  20	  Dan	  Harrison,	  ‘“Barren”	  Gillard	  blasts	  Heffernan’,	  Age,	  2	  May	  2007.	  21	  Adelaide	  Advertiser,	  28	  July	  2010.	  22	  Jacqueline	  Maley,	  ‘When	  in	  Public,	  Gillard	  is	  not	  at	  Home	  with	  the	  Lingo’,	  Age,	  13	  September	  2011;	  Martin	  Flanagan,	  ‘Capturing	  Our	  Female	  Prime	  Minister’,	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  17	  September	  2011.	  	  23	  Phillip	  Hudson,	  ‘Who	  is	  the	  Real	  Julia	  Gillard’,	  Herald	  Sun,	  3	  August	  2010.	  ‘The	  Real	  Julia	  Gillard’,	  ABC	  Radio,	  2	  August	  2010,	  <www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2010/08/02/2971264.htm>.	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  24	  Aristotle	  distinguished	  between	  practices	  he	  described	  as	  oikonomic	  and	  those	  he	  denounced	  as	  chrematistic.	  The	  first	  he	  defined	  as	  properly	  productive,	  a	  natural	  economy;	  the	  second	  as	  consisting	  of	  the	  unproductive	  circulation	  and	  expansion	  of	  money.	  Significantly,	  for	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  ancient	  Greeks	  the	  oikos	  was	  not	  synonymous	  with	  the	  familial	  household.	  It	  is	  only	  later,	  as	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  elaborated	  its	  principles	  of	  marriage	  and	  sexuality,	  that	  the	  Scholastics	  posited	  the	  familial	  household	  as	  the	  space	  of	  the	  properly	  re/productive.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  subprime	  housing	  market	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  see	  Cooper	  and	  Mitropoulos.	  25	  Angela	  Mitropoulos,	  ‘Legal,	  Tender:	  The	  Genealogical	  Economy	  of	  Pride,	  Debt	  and	  Origin’,	  Social	  
Text,	  vol.	  29,	  no.	  3,	  2011,	  pp.	  73–91.	  	  26	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Human	  Condition,	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  Chicago,	  1998,	  p.	  28.	  I	  remain	  critical	  of	  Arendt’s	  argument	  in	  the	  detail,	  but	  suffice	  to	  note	  that	  while	  Foucault	  discusses	  many	  of	  the	  same	  historical	  shifts	  as	  does	  Arendt,	  her	  striking	  absence	  from	  his	  analysis	  underlines	  the	  need	  to	  move	  beyond	  theories	  of	  biopolitics	  to	  a	  critical	  understanding	  of	  oiko-­‐politics.	  27	  Elizabeth	  A.	  Povinelli,	  The	  Empire	  of	  Love:	  Toward	  a	  Theory	  of	  Intimacy,	  Genealogy,	  and	  Carnality,	  Public	  Planet	  Books/Duke	  University	  Press,	  Durham,	  DC,	  2006.	  28	  It	  might	  be	  noted	  that	  I	  do	  not	  use	  genealogy	  here	  in	  the	  sense	  usually	  understood	  as	  a	  Foucauldian	  methodology.	  Indeed,	  I	  argue	  elsewhere	  (in	  Contract	  and	  Contagion)	  that	  Foucault’s	  oblique	  reading	  of	  Nietzsche	  is	  circumvented	  by	  his	  remarks	  on	  parrhesia,	  and	  that	  he	  returns	  in	  his	  later	  writings	  to	  a	  neo-­‐Aristotelian	  romanticisation	  of	  the	  oikos	  as	  the	  premise	  of	  his	  ethics.	  Here	  and	  in	  other	  writings,	  I	  regard	  genealogy	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  legible	  re/production	  and	  the	  rights	  associated	  with	  it.	  For	  a	  psychoanalytically	  inflected	  discussion	  of	  the	  connections	  between	  heterosexuality	  and	  futurity,	  see	  Lee	  Edelman,	  No	  Future:	  Queer	  Theory	  and	  the	  Death	  Drive,	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  Durham,	  2004.	  	  29	  Leopoldina	  Fortunati	  has	  argued	  that	  reproductive	  labour	  is	  ‘the	  creation	  of	  value’	  that	  ‘appears	  otherwise’	  (The	  Arcane	  of	  Reproduction:	  Housework,	  Prostitution,	  Labor	  and	  Capital,	  Autonomedia,	  New	  York,	  1995,	  p.	  8).	  David	  Staples	  takes	  this	  up	  in	  relation	  to	  affective	  labour	  in	  ‘Women’s	  Work	  and	  the	  Ambivalent	  Gift	  of	  Entropy,’	  in	  Clough	  and	  Halley	  (eds),	  pp.	  110–50.	  The	  implicit	  argument	  I	  make	  here	  is	  that	  the	  extension	  of	  surplus	  labour	  that	  this	  expectation	  of	  a	  labour	  freely	  given	  has	  always	  been	  the	  central	  logic	  of	  capitalist	  re/production.	  In	  this,	  the	  wage	  has	  historically	  indicated	  the	  shifting	  lines	  of	  compensatory	  exclusion,	  hierarchy	  and	  recognition—rather	  than	  being	  remunerative	  in	  any	  symmetrical	  sense.	  30	  Marx	  was	  not	  always	  alert	  to	  the	  ways	  surplus	  labour	  is	  constituted	  by	  that	  which	  exists	  outside	  or	  beyond	  the	  wage	  contract,	  though	  it	  is	  shaped	  by	  it,	  often	  in	  the	  most	  intimate	  of	  ways.	  That	  said,	  the	  writings	  in	  the	  Grundrisse	  and	  the	  third	  volume	  of	  Capital	  complicate	  the	  easy	  distinctions	  between	  production,	  reproduction,	  circulation	  and	  exchange	  (Capital,	  vol.	  III,	  Penguin,	  London,	  1991;	  
Grundrisse:	  Foundations	  of	  the	  Critique	  of	  Political	  Economy,	  Penguin,	  London,	  1973).	  31	  On	  the	  simultaneity	  of	  abundance	  and	  austerity,	  Rafferty	  and	  Yu	  note	  that	  ‘The	  current	  crisis	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  paradoxical	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  a	  crisis	  amidst	  abundance.	  At	  its	  most	  basic,	  in	  Australia,	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  GDP	  per	  capita	  has	  increased	  by	  42	  per	  cent	  since	  1990	  alone’.	  Mike	  Rafferty	  and	  Serena	  Yu,	  Shifting	  
Risk:	  Work	  and	  Working	  Life	  in	  Australia.	  A	  Report	  for	  the	  Australian	  Council	  of	  Trade	  Unions,	  Workplace	  Research	  Centre,	  University	  of	  Sydney,	  September	  2010,	  pp.	  4–5.	  	  A	  longer	  discussion	  of	  the	  connections	  between	  this	  and	  the	  political	  friction	  over	  the	  mining	  and	  carbon	  taxes	  during	  the	  term	  of	  the	  Gillard	  Government	  is	  undoubtedly	  relevant	  here.	  32	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Global	  Financial	  Stability	  Report,	  April	  2005,	  <www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2005/01/index.htm>.	  33	  Rafferty	  and	  Yu,	  p.	  3.	  34	  AAP,	  ‘Women	  Take	  up	  Costello’s	  Baby	  Challenge’,	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  2	  June	  2006.	  35	  Deborah	  Brennan,	  ‘Babies,	  Budgets,	  and	  Birthrates:	  Work/Family	  Policy	  in	  Australia,	  1996–2006,’	  
Social	  Politics:	  International	  Studies	  in	  Gender,	  State	  and	  Society,	  vol.	  14,	  no.	  1,	  2007,	  p.	  50.	  36	  Australian	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics,	  ‘Population	  Projections,	  Australia,	  2006	  to	  2101’,	  <www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3222.0>.	  37	  Jacques	  André,	  ‘Le	  renversement	  de	  senglis:	  histoire	  et	  filiation,’	  CARE,	  no.	  10,	  1983,	  p.	  46.	  38	  This	  essay	  was	  largely	  written	  prior	  to	  the	  impending	  introduction	  of	  a	  carbon	  tax	  and	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  any	  price	  rises	  between	  households	  and	  corporations.	  The	  Greens	  made	  support	  for	  such	  a	  tax	  conditional	  upon	  the	  subsidisation	  of	  lower-­‐	  and	  middle-­‐income	  households.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  however,	  it	  remains	  unclear	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  will	  be	  the	  case	  as	  the	  policy	  is	  rolled	  out.	  On	  the	  impact	  of	  recycling	  on	  increasing	  domestic	  labour	  carried	  out	  mostly	  by	  women,	  see	  Caroline	  J.	  Oates	  and	  Seonaidh	  McDonald,	  ‘Recycling	  and	  the	  Domestic	  Division	  of	  Labour’,	  Sociology,	  vol.	  40,	  no.	  3,	  2006,	  pp.	  417–33.	  The	  debate	  on	  recycling	  is	  a	  broader	  discussion,	  involving	  questions	  about	  the	  relative	  emphasis	  on	  household	  recycling	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  changing	  production	  methods	  and	  energy	  sources;	  the	  energy	  required	  to	  collect,	  sort,	  process	  and	  deliver	  reused	  materials;	  the	  health	  and	  conditions	  of	  low-­‐wage	  workers	  in	  recycling	  industries;	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  global	  trade	  in	  hazardous	  materials	  in,	  most	  notably,	  the	  recycling	  of	  electrical	  and	  electronic	  equipment.	  The	  issue,	  of	  course,	  is	  not	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